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(On legal sized double space)
The Nurnberg Verdict, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 858
(1947)
^check carefully^ Bibliograph from note 3,
p.858; Note 1, p.857
I.M.T. found that there was planning to wage
wars at least as early as Nov. 5, 1937 and
probably before that. Opinion 16, 34
ImT specifically found that the war initiated
against Poland on Sept. 1, 1939, was an
aggressive war which developed in due course,
on the basis of systematic preparation, into
further aggressive wars which embraced almost
the whole world. Opinion 34

IMT found that Austria was occupied pursuant
to a common plan of aggression, opinion 2124,145.
IMT found that Bohemia & Moravia were
occupied by (over)

military force. Opinion 24-27, 160. Such
findings were necessary to sustain the
conviction of von Schirach and von Neurath of
Crimes against Humanity in the respective
countries. (Harvard Law Rev. Note 48)
IMT found "Continued planning, with
(CROSSED OUT the) aggressive war as the
objective, has been established beyond doubt.
IMT convicted 8 defendants and acquitted
fourteen of participation in the common plan.
Of the eight convicted, four were military men
(Goering, Keitel Raeder, & Jodl), two foreign
ministers (von Neurath and Ribbentrop) and
two high in Nazi circles (Hess and Rosenberg)

The most significant thing (CROSSED
OUT about the) achievement of the Nurenberg
verdict is that it emphasized the basic
determination of the Charter: that aggressive
war is a crime and all who participate in a
conspiracy to that end are answerable. Harvard
Law Rev p. 868.
(CROSSED OUT IMT evidenced)
IMT seemed to adopt view
(a) that criminal statutes are to be
interpreted restrictively;
(b) lack of sympathy for the conspiracy
concept.
Importance of getting at the substance of
things.
Refutation of the coincidence argument.
In the IMT Goering (Tr. 12976, July 4) argued
that the defendants had never conspired
together; and that some were not originally

members, while others had (CROSSED OUT
been) long been high officials of the party.
Jackson's reply; "It contradicts experience that
this was merely a coincidence that men of such
diverse backgrounds and talents should so
forward each other's aims." They all had
different roles because of the grand nature of
the enterprise. But all made "integrated and
necessary contributions to the joint
undertaking...The activities off all these
defendants...blend together into one consistent
and militant pattern animated by a common
objective to reshape the (CROSSED OUT
may) map of Europe by force of arms."
Harvard Law Rev. p. 870 The
(CROSSED OUT The standard set in the
Harvard ley Law Rev. Article the IMT is)

IMT standard which we must apply is to
inquire whether the defendants, with knowledge
of Hitler's aims, gave him their cooperation –
(opinion pp. 55-56) This is the standard to judge
participation in the common plan. But as to what
constitutes (CROSSED OUT the plan) a
common plan, the IMT rejected the prosecutions
broad theory. *The IMT said that (CROSSED
OUT the conspiracy mus) a conspiracy to wage
aggressive war must be clearly outlined in its
purpose with a concrete plan to wage war as its
subject.
Further must not be too far removed from the
time of decision and action. The Tribunal must
examine whether a concrete plan to wage war
existed, and determine the participants in that
concrete plan. (Opinion pp.50-55, Harvard Law
Rev. p. 871)
(But it can be argued that this was only rejecting
the broad conception of conspiracy that any
significant participation in the affairs of the Nazi
party or government was criminal – it is not in
point as to specific acts of participation here
charged.

The prosecution in (CROSSED OUT effect)
substance was arguing that the Nazi
government itself was an open conspiracy and
that any one who participated in it was guilty.
It does not follow that the (CROSSED OUT
plan in which) phases of the plan in which
these defendants participated is not concrete or
^not^ clearly outlined in its criminal purpose)
Hebert

But even accepting the IMT's restricted
definition of conspiracy – does it follow that
the [CROSSED OUT defendants wer 14
defendants] acquittal of 14 defendants was
fairly justifiable under the evidence?
Note IMT found that a common plan to
prepare and wage war existed probably before
November, 1937 – that plan was clearly
outlined in its criminal purpose and not too far
removed from the time of action. So query did
not of these fourteen defendants cooperate in
that common plan with knowledge of its aims?
Harvard Law Rev. 872
(Hebert Note: If IMT decided that there was
common planning to war i.e. conspiracy
possibly prior to Nov, 1937, [CROSSED OUT
a time at which the definite decisions to attack]
does it not follow that plan to attack a specific
country is not a necessary element – plan to
wage war if and wherever necessary

to achieve political objectives will suffice –
whole question therefore turns on knowledge
which in turns means knowledge of what? See
analysis below of Shalcht's case)

Uniform defense in IMT was lack of
knowledge that aggressive war was
contemplated. (That will be the uniform defense
in our case.)
Keitel argued that the military supported
Hitler in rejecting the noarmament provisions of
the Treaty of Versailles but that he did not
forsee the danger of aggressive war because
rearmament was not adequate for such a war
even in 1939. (Krauch makes substantially same
contention.)
Schacht argued that he could not be charged
with having more knowledge that the
rearmament was aggressive than Keitel and
Keitel ^contended that he^ could not be held
more accountable than the sophisticated
Schacht, who had been Plenipotentiary for War
Economy. (All Farben defendants contend that
they cannot be held more

accountable for knowledge of the aggressive
character of the rearmament than the acquitted
IMT defendants – See motion to dismiss
***
(A major difficulty is the contention that
Hitler's protestations of peaceful intentions
were widely believed. High Allied leaders had
stated belief in Hitler's peaceful intentions.
Mightn't defendant's have believed that
[CROSSED OUT Hitler w] was bluffing and
would not make war? But weren't defendants,
by virtue of their positions and [CROSSED
OUT know] nature of the war production in a
better position to [CROSSED OUT judge]
determine the true aims of Hitler?
This interjects a doubtful note in the evidence
in IMT case.-) Harvard Law Review article,
p.873 points out that –"xx the gaps in the
evidence had not all been filled. Except for the
notes of the key conferences with Hitler, there
were few documents definitely linking the nonmilitary defendants with preparation for a
specific war." The prosecution, therefore,
asked

the Tribunal to infer knowledge and intimated
the use of an objective standard, i.e., that
defendants either knew or are chargeable with
knowledge that the war for which they were
making ready would be a war of German
aggression. (Harvard L. Rev. p. 873)
"The Tribunal, however, insisted on being
shown that the defendant did, in fact know. In
some few instances it was willing to infer
substantive knowledge." (Hebert Note: This is
substantially my position as to the Farben
defendants.) "It inferred that Hess discussed
war plans in conference with Hitler." (Query:
Am I willing to infer that Krauch discussed
war plans in conferences with Goering? But is
it necessary to infer when the evidence shows
that Krauch told Goering in substance that the
figures were no good for making war? Isn't that
enough?)

"It inferred that Fink knew, or deliberately
closed his eyes to the fact, that his Reichs bank
was the recipient of the personal belongings of
concentration camp victims. But as a general
standard the requirement of actual knowledge
proved beyond a reasonable doubt was
maintained."
This requirement is exceedingly difficult
to maintain in the case of the non-military
defendant. "In the absence of direct evidence
of participating in the planning, and inference
of actual knowledge could be drawn only from
such unusual circumstances as existed in the
case of Hess. The contradictory nature of Nazi
propaganda, now belligerent, now conciliatory,
and the ever-present claim that rearmament
was to "defend" Germany from its neighbors
made it easy for defense counsel to stress the
naiveté of their clients." (Harvard Law Rev.
p873)

"To show their knowledge and to establish when
they joined the conspiracy present an almost
insolvable problem of proof."
Schacht's case - none of the defendants had
made a greater contribution toward increasing
Germany's war potential. By 1937 he had
financed the vigorous rearmament program and
actively organized German economy for ware.
But rearmament is not a crime - must be ^carried
out^ part of the Nazi plan to wage aggressive war.
Did Schacht know he was helping Hitler on the
road to war? Schacht was acquitted because the
necessary inference of knowledge of the Nazi
aggressive plans was not established beyond a
reasonable doubt.
*** What is mean by knowledge of "Nazi
aggressive plans" here? Does it mean knowledge
of preparations for war against a particular
country - that is does it mean concrete plans for a
specific aggression? (Defense motion raises this
and we will have to pass on this question -)
Does it mean [CROSSED OUT Harvard Law
Review] knowledge of ultimate aggression in the
event Germany's demands were not satisfied?
(This is

the position I take - "Knowledge of Hitler's
aims" - "Knowledge of the Nazi aggressive
plans" means knowledge that aggression will be
the result if German demands are not satisfied.

Harvard Law Review Says: "It is possible
that the Tribunal based the acquittal (of Schacht)
solely on a ruling that general knowledge,
unaccompanied by knowledge of preparations
for war at a specific time against a specific
country, was insufficient in law. Such a doctrine
would seem indefensible. The prosecution
contended, however, that Schacht had
knowledge of, and participated in, planning and
preparing for ultimate aggression in the event
that Germany's demands were not satisfied.
There are indications in the opinion that the
Tribunal - after acquitting Schacht under Count
One because, even were the prosecution's theory
adopted, it had not been established beyond a
reasonable doubt that Schacht knew of general
plans for aggressive war. If that was its view, the
Tribunal's conclusion

that such knowledge on Schacht's part was
note established is difficult to support."
(Harvard Law Review p. 875)
(The above quotation supports the view
that knowledge of general plans for aggressive
war or knowledge of ultimate aggression in the
event Germany's demands are not satisfied is
sufficient knowledge to create criminal
responsibility for participation in the common
plan or conspiracy to wage aggressive ware. It
should also be noted that this passage and note
76 to the Article, support the view that Count
two (similar to our count one) charged as
aggressive the attacks on Poland and
subsequent invasions & that Schacht had not
participated in these. Under our count one we
must determine whether there was
participation etc in the specific aggressive wars
[CROSSED OUT dealt with] enumerated in
paragraph 2 of the indictment.)

(quote Harvard Law Rev Article as marked on
pp. 875-879)

(It is my view that aggression can be planned
with the number two man as well as with the
No.1 man - this means that Krauch could plan
aggressive war with Goering with out
knowledge of specific plans to wage
aggressive wars against specific countries
provided that he knows the aim is ultimate
aggression. There is no reason to hold that
[CROSSED OUT principals in] participants
the common plan must be at the Hitler level.)

Von Papen
Crucial question was whether he knew of
the plans to occupy Austria by force, if
necessary. From the evidence concerning von
Papen's activities, probable knowledge of these
plans, or at least familiarity with the Nazi
aggressive aims, might be inferred. An
application of a standard of subjective
knowledge, coupled with the necessity of
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, had
led to Schacht's acquittal.
Speer
Did not become a top Nazi official until
1942 after all aggressive wars had been
initiated. After 1942 his position in many
respects in relation to armament was similar to
that of Schacht in the rearmament years. The
IMT found that "his activities in charge of
German armament production

were in aid of the war effort in the same way
that other productive enterprises aid in the
waging of war" and were not part of the
common plan within count one.
(Can't this be explained on a ground that
the
purposes of the common plan had been
consummated - all aggressive wars had been
launched)
Other acquitted defendants had less
knowledge that Schacht - Frick, Frank & von
Schirach.
quote p. 881 as marked

Harvard L. Rev. p 881 - "Count one, which
embodied the common plan, and Count Two,
which charged the defendants with
participation in the planning, preparation,
initiation and waging of specific aggressive
wars in violation of international treaties, were
interrelated and to a large extent overlapping,
The Tribunal felt, without, without expressly
so stating, that knowledge of definite
aggressive intentions sufficed for conviction
under Count One, even if the defendant had
idea who would be the ultimate victim of the
aggression. Under Count Two, however, the
allegations of the indictment were limited to
twelve specific aggressions; therefore,

knowledge of the specific plans to invade one
of the enumerated countries had to be shown.
(Note: IMT indictment charged the
defendants with initiating war against Poland,
the United Kingdom, and France in Sept. 1939,
and other wars thereafter, ending with the war
against the United States. Reference was made
to Count one for allegations that the wars were,
in fact, aggressive, and the proof as to this was
offered under Count One. The proof under
Count Two was thus limited to setting forth the
treaties agreements, and assurances. These are
set [CROSSED OUT out] forth in Appendix C
of the indictment and discussed in the opinion
at 46-54. The Tribunal made no finding on the
initiation of war against the United Kingdom
and France

"But the test of whether the function was of
vital importance in the war was not the sole
contention. Despite Speer's considerable
importance as head of the German armament
ministry, the Tribunal stated that the type of
aid given to the war effort by "productive
enterprises" did not constitute "waging" ware.
The Ultimate test of responsibility under Count
Two, then seems to have been the importance
of the activity plus and "aggressive"
characteristic of the activity - reaching out into
the war or zone of occupation." (Query: Can I
accept that in my thinking? It seems
anomalous to convict on waging war alone after war is on they were doing theer duty as
private citizens in response to orders of the
state.")

(But this is hard to harmonize with the
conviction of Frick & Seyss-Ignant who were
convicted of waging aggressive war - because
they administered occupied territory of vital
importance in the aggressive war being waged
by Germany.)
Harvard L Rev. Conclusion p. 903. - In future
trials for Crimes against Peace the prosecution
would be handicapped if it were confined to
limits set in the opinion. If industrialists were
among the defendants, the prosecution would
be faced with a ruling that "production" is no
part of the crime of waging war. It would be
faced with the need of proof, a fatal omission
in the Schacht case, that rearmament was
carried out with actual knowledge

of aggressive war plans.
(Note 203. The exent to which the
Nuernberg verdict will be followed as a
precedent may be shown by the pending case
against the
I. G. Farben officials, U.S. v. Krauch. The first
count of the indictment charges preparation
and waging of aggressive warfare. The issue is
whether Farben's executives knew that the war
was to be one of aggression. the same question
must be faced in connection with Farben's
efforts to weaken the United States and Great
Britain through cartel agreements, propaganda,
intelligence and espionage activities. The other
counts charge plunder and spoliation, slavery
and mass murder, membership in the SS as to
certain defendants, and a common

plan or conspiracy to commit Crimes against
Peace as defined in Allied Control Council
Law No. 10. x x x x x
xxxxxxxx“

page 905 - Like any precedent the Nurnberg
opinion is susceptible to interpretation and
development.
(1) Another tribunal may fuel that knowledge
of aggressive intentions may be inferred from
an individual's position and his ability to learn
the facts; or
(2) Or it may distinguish an "open" conspiracy,
as in this case where the German Government
with its manifold preparations was patently
headed for war, from a conspiracy where the
leading figures develop programs for
aggression in secret. In the latter case, it may
be argued, the

customary rules of Anglo-American law
should apply. The case of "open" conspiracy
where, the common plan is co-extensive with
the ruling political group, would seem to be
more within the preventative realm of the
United Nations Security Council, which can
keep informed and take necessary action; than
the province of a criminal court.

